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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - PROPERTY - CLAUSE PROVIDING FOR
REVERTER UPON USE BY NON-WHITES HELD VALID.- Defendants
gave real property to plaintiff for use as a public park, the deed pro-
viding for an automatic reversion of title to the grantor if the property
was used by non-whites. A number of Negroes petitioned the plain-
tiff for permission to use the park golf course. Thereupon plaintiff
brought a declaratory judgment action to determine the validity of
this reverter clause. Reasoning that the fourteenth amendment would
not be violated because the title would revert without judicial action,
the Court held that the grant created a determinable fee which would
terminate upon use by non-whites. Charlotte Park and Recreation
Comnzn v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d 114 (1955).
Up to the year 1917, municipal ordinances were the primary legal
devices for effectuating segregation in housing.' In that year, how-
ever, the Supreme Court declared municipal ordinances which provide
for segregation in housing to be unconstitutional.2 Thereafter, the re-
striction of ownership and use of property by Negroes became an
individual matter, and the use of the restrictive racial covenant became
widespread.3 Prior to 1948, such covenants were almost unanimously
held to be valid and enforceable when restricting use and occupancy,
4
but received conflicting treatment when they attempted to restrict
ownership.5
The landmark case of Shelley v. Kraemer 6 held that court en-
forcement of such covenants is unconstitutional, yet declared that these
covenants were valid as between the parties. Thereafter, New York 7
1 Lowe, Racial Restrictive Covenants, 1 ALA. L. REv. 15-16 (1948).
2 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
3 Lowe, supra note 1, at 16, 17 n.11. See also Comment, 45 MicH. L. Rev.
733-36 (1947).
4 See, e.g., Stone v. Jones, 66 Cal. App. 2d 264, 152 P.2d 19 (1944) (per
curiam) ; Meade v. Dennistone, 173 Md. 295, 196 At. 330 (1938) ; Malicke v.
Milan, 320 Mich. 65, 30 N.W.2d 440 (1948); Thornhill v. Herdt, 130 S.W.2d
175 (Mo. 1939). But see Foster v. Stewart, 134 Cal. App. 482, 25 P.2d 497
(1933) (in which a covenant was held void which restricted against occupancy
by persons of any other race than Caucasian for an unlimited time).
5 Compare Hundley v. Gorewitz, 132 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1942) ; Steward
v. Cronan, 105 Colo. 393, 98 P.2d 999 (1940) ; Lyons v. Wallen, 191 Okla. 567.
133 P.2d 555 (1942) (per curiam) (holding such covenants to be valid), with
Porter v. Barrett, 233 Mich. 373, 206 N.W. 532 (1925); White v. White, 10
W. Va. 128, 150 S.E. 531 (1929) (denying validity).6334 U.S. 1 (1948).
, See, e.g., Kemp v. Rubin, 298 N.Y. 590, 81 N.E.2d 325 (1948) (meni.
opinion). This decision reversed the holdings of the Supreme Court and the
Appellate Division on this issue, both of which had been handed down prior to
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and other jurisdictions 8 refused to directly enforce these covenants.
However, up until 1953, some courts permitted recovery of damages
for breach of such a covenant.9 In that year the Supreme Court ruled
that the awarding of damages also is unconstitutional.' 0
The fourteenth amendment does not afford protection against
individual action, however discriminatory; its applicability is limited
to state action." Following the Civil Rights Cases,'2 courts have
construed state action to include judicial, as well as legislative, acts.'3
Since the courts have so interpreted the phrase-state action--it fol-
lows that all court action, which gives effect to a right which arises
out of a discriminatory provision in a deed, should come under this
constitutional prohibition.' 4 In the instant case, the Court, basing its
decision on the fact that the reverter clause in the deed would operate
independently of court action, held that there was no violation of the
fourteenth amendment; since title would revest automatically upon the
happening of the condition,' 5 the grantor would not need to enlist the
aid of the courts to regain that title.
The grantor would, however, still be faced with the problem of
regaining possession. Only two avenues are open to him, self-help
or an action in ejectment."' Since the latter is court action, it should
be precluded under the doctrine of Shelley v. Kraemer, and the fact
that such action does not operate directly to enforce the right, i.e.,
revesting of title, should be immaterial. Further, it would appear that
the right to self-help is dependent upon a coexisting right to resort
Shelley v. Kraemner. See Kemp v. Rubin, 188 Misc. 310, 69 N.Y.S.2d 680
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 273 App. Div. 789, 75 N.Y.S.2d 768 (2d Dep't 1947).
8 See, e.g., Cumings v. Hokr, 31 Cal. 2d 844, 193 P.2d 742 (1948) (per
curiam) ; Tovey v. Levy, 401 Ill. 393, 82 N.E.2d 441 (1948) ; Correll v. Earley,
205 Okla. 366, 237 P.2d 1017 (1951).
9 See, e.g., Weiss v. Leaon, 359 Mo. 1054, 225 S.W2d 127 (1949) (per
curiam); Correll v. Earley, supra note 8. Crntra, Roberts v. Curtis, 93 F.
Supp. 604 (D.D.C. 1950).
10 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
11 See United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882) ; Powe v. United States,
109 F.2d 147 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 679 (1940); Claybrook v.
Owensboro, 16 Fed. 297 (D. Ky. 1883).
12 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
13 "The judicial act of the highest court of the State, in authoritatively
construing and enforcing its laws, is the act of the State." Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 90-91 (1908). See Civil Rights Cases supra note 12 at 6;
Voigt v. Webb, 47 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Wash. 1942) ; International Union of
Mine Workers v. Tennessee Copper Co., 31 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D. Tenn. 1940).
14 "When the court takes jurisdiction of the case and enforces, whether by
declaratory judgment or some other form of judicial proceeding, the discrim-
inatory provisions, whether they be in the form of reverter clauses or re-
strictive covenants, it is then that state action is in contravention to the
Fourteenth Amendment." 60 DICK. L. Rev. 191, 194 (1956). See also Kenney
v. Fox, 132 F. Supp. 305, 309 (W.D. Mich. 1955).
15 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.12 (Casner ed. 1952); RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY § 44 (1936) ; WALSH, PROPERTY § 227 (2d ed. 1937).
16 32 N. DAK. L. REv. 61-62 (1956).
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to legal proceedings for the same relief.' 7 Under this expanded view
of what constitutes state action, the ultimate effect on the grantor
would be the same whether the device chosen is a restrictive covenant,
as in the Shelley case, or an automatic reverter clause, as in the present
case. In both instances, whether the person is a grantor with a pos-
sibility of reverter or a covenantee, he will be left with an empty right,
impossible of enforcement.
If the courts intend to strictly enforce the fourteenth amendment
insofar as discriminatory racial provisions are concerned, Shelley v.
Kraemer should not be confined, as in the instant case, to restrictive
racial covenants, but should be recognized as establishing a consti-
tutional principle. Complete clarification, however, can be achieved
only when the present distinction between "valid" and "enforceable"
is eliminated, and such discriminatory conditions are definitely de-
clared to be illegal. Such action would preclude the possibility of a
recurrence of the peculiar results reached in the instant case.
A
CONTRACTS - PLEDGES - ADEQUATE PUBLIC NOTICE OF SALE
REQUIRED, DESPITE WAIVER, WHERE ESSENTIAL TO GooD FAITH. -
Plaintiff-executor instituted a discovery proceeding to ascertain
whether defendant converted certain stock which had been pledged to
secure a promissory note made by the testator. The contract of pledge
contained a provision authorizing public or private sale on default,
waiving any advertisement. Defendant-pledgee bought in the stock at
public auction held pursuant to an advertisement which set forth only
the names and number of shares of stocks offered. In answer to
plaintiff's allegation that such notice of sale was inadequate, defendant
pleaded the waiver. The Court held that notwithstanding testator's
waiver, the pledgee was still obliged to give detailed notice of sale
since such was essential to good faith. Matter of Kiarnie, 309 N.Y.
325, 130 N.E.2d 745 (1955).
The relation between pledgor and pledgee has traditionally been
regarded as one of trust 1 and at early common law the pledgor was
accorded a considerable amount of protection. For example, the
17 "In order that the actor may be entitled as against the other to the im-
mediate possession of the land, it is necessary that he have a right to possession
which he can enforce against the other by legal proceedings appropriate for
the recovery of the possession of land." RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 90, comment a
(1934).
'See Lord v. Hartford, 175 Mass. 320, 56 N.E. 609 (1900); Persons v.
Russell, 212 Ala. 506, 103 So. 543, 545 (1925) (dictum); Hudgens v. Cham-
berlain, 161 Cal. 710, 120 Pac. 422, 424 (1911) (dictum).
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